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In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades.
Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle.
However, in this paper, we argue that there are serious bugs hidden in their proofs.
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1. Introduction
The revelation principle is well-known in the economic literature. It has several
versions of representations [1-3]. In Ref. [2], Myerson said: “...the revelation principle
tells us that, for any general coordination mechanism, any equilibrium of rational
communication strategies for the economic agents can be simulated by an equivalent
incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism, where a trustworthy mediator
maximally centralizes communication and makes honesty and obedience rational
equilibrium strategies for the agents”.
Although the revelation principle is fundamental and essential to the field of
mechanism design, in this paper we will argue that there are serious bugs in two
versions of proofs. The rest of the paper are organized as follows: In Section 2, we
will analyse the bug in Myerson’s proof [1]. Then, we will point out the bug in the
proof given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [3].
2. The bug in Myerson’s proof
In this section, the notation is referred to Ref. [1]. The bug will be showed by the
following three claims. We use the capital form to emphasize key words.
Claim 1: For each agent i, ti and di are his private information.
Proof : See Page 69, Line 26 [1], “...each type ti in Ti represents a complete
description of all the private information i might have about his environment, his
abilities and his preferences. Each private decision-option di in Di may represent,
for example, a level of effort which agent i might exert in working for the principal,
and which the principal cannot observe or control”. Obviously, Claim 1 holds.
Claim 2: For each agent i, the two mappings ρi : Ti → Ri and δi :Mi×Ti → Di
are his private information.
Proof : See Page 71, Line 19 [1], “In the context of this coordination mechanism
((Ri,Mi)ni=1, pi), each agent i controls his choice of reporting strategy in Ri as a
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function of his type, and controls his choice of a decision in Di as a function of
his type and his message received. That is, agent i SELECTS a pair of functions
ρi : Ti → Ri and δi : Mi × Ti → Di, such that ρi(ti) would be agent i’s reporting
strategy if i were of type ti, and δi(mi, ti) would be i’s final decision in Di after he
received message mi if his type were ti”.
In a general system, each agent i acts independently and self-interestedly when
he selects his participation strategy (ρi, δi). Any agent has incentives to report
dishonestly and act disobediently whenever doing so is better for him. Thererfore,
the two mappings ρi : Ti → Ri and δi : Mi × Ti → Di must be agent i’s private
information.
Claim 3: There is a bug in Myerson’s proof.
Proof : See Page 74, Line 1 [1], “...Let δ−1(d, t) be the set of all messages to the
agents such that each agent i would respond by choosing decision di if his type were
ti. That is,
δ−1(d, t) = {m|δi(mi, ti) = di, for all i}.′′
It is implicit WHO IS ABLE to calculate δ−1(d, t) for any arbitrarily given d and
t. We emphasize the ability to do the calculation because anybody who wants to
calculate δ−1(d, t) must be able to get all necessary data. As discussed in Claim 2,
the mapping δi is private information of agent i and unknown to the principal. It is
impossible for the principal to calculate δ−1(d, t) when he is given some arbitrary
t ∈ T1 × · · · × Tn and d ∈ D1 × · · · ×Dn.
See Page 74, Line 5 [1], “Then, define pi∗ : D × T → R so that
pi∗(d|t) =
∑
m∈δ−1(d,t)
pi(d0,m|ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn)).
pi∗ is the direct coordination mechanism which simulates the overall effect of the
original mechanism with the given participation strategies”.
It is also implicit WHO IS ABLE to calculate ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn) for any arbi-
trarily given t1, · · · , tn. Although in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agent i has
incentives to truthfully report ρi(ti) to the principal if ti is his true type, it is unrea-
sonable to assume that each agent i has incentives to TRUTHFULLY report ρi(tˆi)
to the principal for all possible tˆi ∈ Ti. Hence, it is impossible for the principal to
calculate ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn) for any arbitrarily given t1, · · · , tn.
To sum up, the principal cannot calculate δ−1(d, t) or ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn). Conse-
quently, the principal cannot calculate pi∗. In Page 6, Line 24 [2], Myerson assumed
a virtual person (named mediator) to calculate pi∗: “The assumption that perfectly
trustworthy mediators are available is essential to the mathematical simplicity of
the incentive-compatible set”. Therefore, pi∗ can only be calculated by the assumed
mediator, NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL. However, in Page 73, Proposition 2 [1], My-
erson said: “... there exists an incentive-compatible direct mechanism pi∗ in which
the PRINCIPAL gets the same expected utility...”.
That’s the bug!
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3. The bug in the proof by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
In this section, the notation follows from Ref. [3]. In the derivation of formula
(23.D.3), the authors substitute s∗i (θˆi) for sˆi appeared in the formula (23.D.2).
Since (23.D.2) holds for all sˆi ∈ Si, it looks reasonable to do so at the first sight.
As we have pointed out in Section II, for each agent i, the strategy s∗i is his
private information. Although in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each agent i has in-
centives to truthfully report s∗i (θi) to the principal if agent i’s type is θi, it is
unreasonable to assume that each agent i has incentives to TRUTHFULLY report
s∗i (θˆi) (for all θˆi ∈ Θi) to the principal. Hence, the item s∗i (θˆi) (for all θˆi ∈ Θi)
is indeed NOT AVAILABLE to the principal. Consequently, the formula (23.D.3)
doesn’t hold.
That’s the bug!
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